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Introduction
The idea of public support programmes to
strengthen local economic performance is
widely recognized and used by many national
or local governments. The basic rationale for
support programmes could be found in several
economic theories. The support arguments for
subsidies come from existence of externalities
and market failures see for example [31], for
regional conditions in the Slovak Republic see
for example [24], [25]. The private companies
do not want to invest into activities with positive
externalities (since they are not able to absorb
all the benefits), but these investments are
important for society itself, so the governments
must subsidy such an investment to be
interesting for private enterprises [23]. Another
barrier arises due to risk adverse views of
financial institutions. Some firms can deny
access to credit despite the fact that they have
reasonable projects, but without proper
financial coverage.
However, subsidies must also fulfil certain
criteria to be valuable for economic growth and
prosperity. It is very difficult to correctly set up
and evaluate public support interventions. The
evaluation of public support should identify
whether, and to what extent, the state or
regional support aid schemes have been able
to reduce the targeted market failure. This
approach involves quantifying both the market
failure and the influence of the public support
scheme on the market failure. However, it is
quite impossible to quantify market failure, let
alone the impact of a policy measure on the
extent of that market failure [22]. We could find
that many jobs have been created in supported
companies or how high growth they achieved
but key questions are different – how many jobs
would be created without this support or with
other use of this support [20]. This leads us to
the question of effectiveness and real need of
public support policies. 
Support subsidies could have various forms
[3], but we will concentrate on public support
programmes. These programmes are the main
form of regional policy instruments in the recent
years. Some main features of these program-
mes are competitiveness in project selection
and evaluation, selection of several different
projects and usually longer implementation
period with several calls. They are also not
negotiated subsidies (e.g. subsidies for foreign
investors).
Another important aspect of this kind of
support is related especially to regional policy.
The main goal of such programmes is to support
development of lagging part of the country of
group of countries. This is also the case of
regional policy of the European Union. This policy
should be no longer viewed as redistributive
policy, but rather the development policy [9]
with ability to define investment priorities, which
are important for region, but companies do not
want to invest into them alone. Otherwise, the
whole regional policy could be only in the form
of unconditional cash transfers [4]. As sum-
marized, the redistributive function is not sufficient
for achievement of efficiency, effectiveness and
social inclusion in the regional policy of the
European Union. To achieve effectiveness of
subsidies we must reassure that public sources
are spent on activities otherwise not realized by
private sector. This ineffectiveness is called
“deadweight” effect and we will analyze this
effect in the case of the Czech and Slovak
Republics. In these countries, no detailed
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analysis on the deadweight effect of subsidies
of private companies has so far been
conducted.
The main purpose of this article is to
measure the deadweight effect and analyze the
internal and external conditions under which
subsidised projects would be abandoned
without public assistance in case of the Czech
and Slovak Republics. The article is organized
as follows. In the first part we look more closely
at the definition of deadweight effect and previous
studies analyzing it. In the methodology part we
discuss different approaches how to measure
this effect and we introduce methodology for our
research. We also discuss potential problems
with interpretation of the results. In the final part
we present the results of our research and
some policy implications.
1. Deadweight Effect
Deadweight effect is one of the forms of
ineffectiveness in additionality principle. The
additionality is one of the key principles of
regional policy of the European Union. Applying
this principle the public support, as market
failure correction should be used only if really
needed and adds value to regional develop-
ment in supported region. Tab. 1 summarizes
all types of potential ineffectiveness within this
principle.
Tab. 1: Type of Ineffectiveness in Applying Additionality Principle
Type of effect Description
Deadweight The proportion of total outputs/outcomes that would have been secured anyway
without the public support
Displacement The proportion of outputs/outcomes that are reduced elsewhere in the target area
Substitution This effect arises from firm substitutes of their own expenses by public support e.g.
a firm substitutes a jobless person to replace an existing worker to take advantage
of the public sector assistance
Leakage The proportion of outputs/outcomes that benefits those outside the target area of the
intervention
Source: BIS (2009), adjusted by authors
Deadweight could be defined as outcomes
of the projects which would have occurred
without public intervention. In our research
deadweight is understood as proportion of
projects planned to be realized also without
obtaining support from the EU funds. One of
the main goals of intervention should minimize
this effect by focusing the finance on projects
that would not be implemented without public
support. This effect is usually the biggest one
from the above mentioned ineffectiveness and
support policy designers must pay adequate
attention to diminish it.
In reality, it is impossible to fully eliminate
deadweight effect. One of main issues here is
asymmetry of information [27]. The government
or other public agencies providing grants will
never have enough information to be sure the
project will not be realized without their support.
The enterprises will always have a tendency to
use public support for their own benefits. They
will try to prepare their projects in the way to
persuade evaluators on necessity to support them.
The opposite problem is “good choice
paradox” [33]. The government tries to select
the best projects for support not the projects
that really need a support. There are two basic
reasons for this. Firstly, executive agencies try
to show the best direct results from their
support programmes. The more direct jobs
from programmes are created or more exports
are achieved, the better for politicians
responsible directly for these programmes and
for sustainability of responsible agencies. The
more detailed consequences of programmes
are evaluated very rarely, especially in the
Central and Eastern European countries. But it
is very probable that these projects are projects
with the highest deadweight effect [35]. This
should be eliminated by adjusting evaluation
criteria to be more sensitive to real needs of the
region and it selects to support enterprises to
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bring new development into the region. Most of
aid schemes really contain only very limited
criteria for the access to real need of the
support for the region.
Empirical studies monitoring this effect are
rather limited. Most of the studies were done in
Western European countries; the studies from
the rest of the world are very scarce. Most of
the recent studies estimate the effect between
30–40 %. The summary of most relevant
studies is in the table 2 below. The lowest
deadweight effect of 20 % was identified by [41]
in Great Britain. On the other hand the effect
could be found in the study of [16] with more
than 70 % of deadweight. The total level of this
effect is very high, indicating more than one
third of public resources spent on activities that
also happened without this support.
Differences could be found not only in total
deadweight estimations in the studies, but also
among different kinds of the support of
enterprises. BIS [3] identified 45 % deadweight
in direct support programmes to enterprises
compared to 33.9 % in investment into physical
infrastructure. Internatiolization of enterprises
was the most effective (only 26% deadweight)
among direct support of enterprises program-
mes. The similar results could be found in study
[7]. The deadweight in direct support program-
mes was 36 %, compared to 15 % in education
programmes. Despite the deadweight effect,
the type of supported activities could primarily
depend on goal of particular regional policy.
Some authors [26] showed that the investment
subsidies tend to decrease employment. On
the other hand employment subsidies stimulate
employment. If the main goal for regional policy
is oriented on unemployment, there should be
support of the employment grants in the first place.
Studies also try to identify reasons for dead-
weight. Found deadweight effect to be statistically
significantly dependent on region development
position and the length of firm existence [35].
The EU evaluation also suggests that the
deadweight tends to be higher in richer regions.
Another important variable is the size of
enterprises. In Hungary there was 90% dead-
weight in the group of large enterprises compared
to 50 % in SME [11]. Large enterprises usually
do not need a public support and this support
only represents additional benefits, but it is not
decisive for the project [18]. But for SME the
support in research activities is very important
for their final decision to implement the project.
The size of enterprise as well as grant type and
number of earlier grants have a significant
impact on the likelihood of a firm to report
deadweight [17]. This is mainly explained by
the fact that firm’s access to finance is likely to
increase with business size [40].
The authors [16] analyzed the ownership of
company on deadweight. They found foreign
companies achieved lower level of deadweight
(7 % less), but statistically not significant. Howe-
ver, we must mention that studies did not consist
of the variables that could cause deadweight
effect. Some studies confirm the importance of
the age of firm [35] received but some do not
[17] and we could find several other examples
in the mentioned studies from the Tab. 2.
Tab. 2: Studies Measuring the Deadweight Effect
Study Country Deadweight effect
Lenihan and Hart (2006) Ireland 73.2 %
Sheehan (1993) Northern Ireland 59 %
De Koning (1993) The Netherlands 40 %
EC (2010) Italy 50 %
IEU (1999) Micro Enterprise Supports Ireland 45 %
Lenihan and Hart (2004) Ireland 42.6–55.8 %.
Davenport et al. (1998) New Zealand 37.5 %
Stierwald and Wiemers (in GEFRA 2010) Germany 28–35 %
Wren (2005) Great Britain 20 %
BIS (2009) Great Britain 43 %
Tokila (2010) Finland 35.9 %
Source: mentioned studies, summarized by authors
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As previous studies show the deadweight
effect is quite substantial and creates pressure
on the public sector to be more effective in the
management of their support programmes.
Especially this is the case in present economic
crisis with strong negative influence on public
revenues and the need to cut public debts.
2. Methodology
There are several methods how to measure
deadweight effects. The main problem with all
of them is counterfactual situation. It means we
try to find out what happens in the case of non
– intervention and its always hypothetical
question [1]. We are not able directly to
compare these two situations to analyze “the
real difference” of applied public support.
Most of the studies were based on interviews
or surveys with enterprises obtaining public
support (e.g. [16], [35], [36]). The degree of the
deadweight effect of the project is estimated by
posting a hypothetical question of what would
happen if the project were not subsidised. For
example [35] used five answers to this question
– the project will be abandoned, the project will
be implemented on a reduced scale, the project
will be implemented on a reduced qualitative
level, the project will be implemented at a later
date and the project will be implemented
unchanged. Then they add to each question
a deadweight from 0 (zero deadweight) to 1 (full
deadweight). We changed this methodology and
mainly due to time aspect. During preliminary
research we found out that there were very
long time delays in the evaluation process for
subsidies, so most of enterprises reported no
time savings, but time delays in the project
implementation due to public support. So we
asked only the question regarding the financial
aspect of the project support: “If you did not get
public support, how big part of the project
budget do you estimate to spend on planned
activities?” We asked this at the end of their
approved project implementation process. We
complement this survey with several interviews
with supported companies to be able to
understand better the reasons why they try to
use public support programmes. The summary
of statistical evaluation of this question is in the
table 3, later in the text.
Another possibility how to evaluate dead-
weight is to ask unsupported projects which
fulfil all the criteria how to obtain support, but
there were not enough funds in that particular
call to support them. The advantage of this
method will be the ability to see the reality not
hypothetical question about what they
implemented from the project. Unfortunately,
information about these projects is no longer
available from the government agencies
granting the subsidies. One pilot study with
these companies shows lower deadweight
effect than in the case surveys of approved
projects [32]. This could be expected result
taking into account the mentioned “good
choice” paradox.
In some cases control group of unassisted
enterprises is created [37] trying to use difference
in different techniques [21] to compare their
development before and after support within
both groups. It is extremely difficult to properly
construct this group, mainly because mutual
influence between these groups. For example if
you select to support bakery and you choose
another bakery to control groups you are not
able to answer the question, if the support itself
(giving an advantage to one of them) or other
external characteristics changed the development
path of these two enterprises. Another problem
with control groups could be the impossibility to
construct it, because support enterprises could
have unique structure or be somehow else
different from the rest of enterprises (selection
bias is in the selection process itself). This is
specially the case of innovation and research
support schemes, where very often best
companies with previous research activities are
supported and it is not possible to find
adequate control group. The methodology of
control groups was used e.g. by [28] or [39].
We conducted our survey on several calls
for projects (KaHR-111DM-0901, KaHR-
111DM-0801, SIA 2009 121 01, Rozvoj I and
EDUCA) from 5 different operational program-
mes. We made a survey and obtained results
from 414 enterprises (291 from the Czech
Republic, 123 from the Slovak Republic). This
sample was representative from the point of
selected programmes and countries. The
survey was conducted during the year 2012.
Only privately owned companies were included
in the survey. The public companies as e.g.
hospitals were excluded, because even if there
is deadweight in these companies, the outputs
will serve the public interests, so we cannot
consider this directly as ineffectiveness of
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public spending. Answers to the question: “If
you did not get public support, how big part of
the project budget do you estimate to spend on
planned activities?”, could be on the scale from
0 % (it means project would not be realized at
all without public support) to 100 % (it means
project would be fully realized even without
public support). The summary of the answers
for research question is in the table 3.
Tab. 3: Statistical Distribution of Answers to the Research Question
Deadweight level Number of answers Number of answers 
(Czech Republic) (Slovakia)
0 % 94 48
1–10 % 18 6
11–20 % 25 5
21–30 % 25 14
31–40 % 4 6
41–50 % 39 18
51–60 % 8 1
61–70 % 13 3
71–80 % 9 1
81–90 % 1 3
91–99 % 0 0
100 % 55 18
Total average deadweight 36.8 %
Source: own research
We statistically evaluated the surveys and
estimated the deadweight effect in different
categories. After this, we used logit regression
model to identify key characteristics that
influence the deadweight effect. Before
constructing the model we used stepwise
selection to identify only statistically significant
characteristics. These methods are appropriate
to such evaluation [34], [29] and were used also
in several previous studies [16]. Sometimes
there were used probit instead of logit models,
but these models show very similar results [17].
The selection of factors possibly influencing
the deadweight was also inspired by several
previous studies. We must leave away two
commonly used characteristics – number of
employees and turnover of enterprises,
because some evaluated programmes were
open only for SME and some also for bigger
companies, so the results for these two
characteristics could be biased by this. We
divided model variables into three main groups,
which could influence the deadweight –
characteristics of enterprise, project and region
(external environment). The Tab. 4 summarizes
all used variables in the model. This was the
first study conducted in two different countries
and tries to identify if this influences the results
of a model compared to previous studies.
3. Results
The results of our model could be found in the
following tables. The Tab. 5 shows the results
of stepwise selection. We found out only two
variables that were statistically important – the
amount of support granted and type of projects
(investments). All other variables were not
statistically significant on more than 5% level.
Tab. 5 shows results of statistical significance
of the constructed model.
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Tab. 4: Independent Variables Used in the Logistic Regression Analyses
Characteristics of enterprise
New firm 1 if company was less than 4 years old, 0 otherwise
Foreign Ownership 1 if owned by a foreign owner, 0 otherwise
Personal Ownership 1 owned by one person, 0 otherwise
Characteristics of project
Amount granted Total amount of grants, divided into 5 categories (code – BUDGET_CAT 
in the following tables of results)
Investment project 1 if investment project (or „hard“ project – project aimed at buying new 
technology), 0 otherwise (or „soft“ project – aimed at the education of 
workforce), (code – TYP_INV in following tables of results)
Characteristics of region
% of unemployed Level of unemployment in the district of residence of 
in the district applicants
Region NUTS III regions according to the residence of applicants
City size City size of subsidies company headquaters (4 categories) 
Country 1 if from the Czech Republic, 0 otherwise (Slovak Republic)
Source: Authors
Tab. 5: Stepwise Selection Results
Summary of Stepwise Selection
Step Effect DF Number Score Wald Pr>ChiSq Variable
Entered Removed
In Chi- Chi- Level
Square Square
1 TYP_INV 1 1 59.6942 <.0001 TYP_INV
2 BUDGET_
3 2 18.8755 0.0003
BUDGET_
CAT CAT
Source: output of SAS Enterprise Guide 4, own research
This shows one very interesting fact. The
variables related to project itself have much
higher influence on deadweight level than other
variables related to a region or an enterprise.
The type of grant and amount of support
received shows as the most important to
determine deadweight effects. The amount of
support received is not a surprised result. The
higher the grant support was, the less likely the
enterprise would realize the activities without
this support. The following interviews clearly
show that there were project proposals of an
enterprise behind its present scope of activities.
They clearly try to get the support to help them
to reach “higher” level of their entrepreneur-
ship, e.g. to buy a new machine equipment,
otherwise too expensive for them, that allows
them to enter new market segment.
The type of investment shows different
results than in previous studies in the Western
European countries. Based on interviews with
some applicants we think the reason under-
values the investments in educational activities.
Basically typical applicants in the investment
support schemes are companies which try to
replace presently used equipment with new
ones, mostly as a part of their “normal” renewal
of technological equipment. These companies
will usually realize their replacement without
public support. On the other hand typical applicants
for educational grants are companies that carry
out the education of workforce, understand how
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it is important, but have limited budget for it.
They try to use an opportunity to cover their
costs for the kind of education they have never
had their own funds for. So without the support
they usually dramatically reduce the amount
spent on educational activities (or come back to
previous level of their expenditures on education
of workforce). Then the amount of funds required
for grant by an applicant in investments
subsidies is usually not higher than their two or
three years annual budget for such activities.
Compared to education grants where the
amount required is in many cases higher than
five years’ company budget on this priority.
Tab. 6: Parameters and Statistical Significance of the Model
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter DF Estimate Standard Wald Pr>ChiSq
Error Chi-Square
Intercept 1 -3.0099 0.5940 25.6789 <.0001
TYP_INV 0.0 1 -0.6952 0.1378 25.4417 <.0001
BUDGET_CAT 01:low -116813.2 1 2.1187 0.6395 10.9782 0.0009
BUDGET_CAT 02:116813.2-240230.135 1 2.3658 0.6391 13.7044 0.0002
BUDGET_CAT 03:240230.135-764149.14 1 2.0923 0.6474 10.4456 0.0012
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0
Test Chi-Square DF Pr>ChiSq
Probable Ratio 83.8691 4 <.0001
Score 71.4221 4 <.0001
Wald 49.5945 4 <.0001
Source: output of SAS Enterprise Guide 4, own research
The Tab. 7 shows the odds ratio estimates
for statistically significant variables. As you can
see there is more than four times higher probability
of deadweight in case of investment type of
grant. The probability of full deadweight in the
project with the budget up to EUR 116,000 is
eight times lower than the probability of project
with the budget higher than EUR 240,000.
Tab. 7: Odds Ratio Estimates
Odds Ratio Estimates
Effect Point Estimate 95% Wald
Confidence Limits
TYP_INV 0.0 vs 1.0 0.249 0.145 0.427
BUDGET_CAT 01:low -116813.2 vs 04:764149.14-high 8.321 2.376 29.138
BUDGET_CAT 02:116813.2-240230.135 vs 04:764149.14-high 10.653 3.044 37.279
BUDGET_CAT 03:240230.135-764149.14 vs 04:764149.14-high 8.104 2.278 28.822
Source: output of SAS Enterprise Guide 4, own research
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Except the model, we statistically evaluate
the achieved level of deadweight in the different
categories. Some of the results are summarized
in the table 8. The total deadweight effect was
36.8 %, so more than one third of public support
was used on projects that were realized also
without this support. This is comparable
number to other studies from Western Europe
and there is no significant difference.
In spite of the characteristics of regions that
were not statistically significant, they are
related to the type of projects. It shows that
more educational projects are from more
developed regions and bigger cities. The effect
of external environment could also be
diminished because two countries with different
development conditions were evaluated.
Very interesting was the deadweight effect
from newly established enterprises. It was slightly
higher than average deadweight. Compared to
established enterprises, the levels of dead-
weight effects were very similar in both
investments and educational types of project. It
seems these companies need to invest into
labour force at the beginning of their existence
with or without public support, so the dead-
weight effect is higher in these projects than in
established enterprises. On the other hand, the
bigger investments into technology, the less
affordable are the established enterprises.
Therefore without public support they are less
likely to realize the proposed projects. We also
found out lower (27.85 %), but statistically not
significant deadweight effect in foreign
enterprises (see Tab. 8).
Tab. 8: Deadweight Effect for Certain Specific Groups of Enterprises
Deadweight effect %
All enterprises 36.8%
All enterprises with less than 4 year existence 38.8%
Enterprises with less than 4 year existence (investments projects) 39.6%
Enterprises with less than 4 year existence (education projects) 35.4%
Foreign enterprises 27.85%
Enterprises from the Slovak Republic 33.15%
Enterprises from the Czech Republic 38.46%
Educational projects in the cities with under 5,000 inhabitants 22.05%
Investments projects in the cities with under 5,000 inhabitants 62.19%
Investments projects in the cities with over 50,000 inhabitants 62.17%
Educational projects in the cities with over 50,000 inhabitants 19.27%
In regions with unemployment over 17 % 33%
In regions with unemployment under 7 % 39.78%
Enterprises with investment projects 53.4%
Enterprises with educational projects 22.4%
Source: own research
Conclusion
We found out that more than a third of public
support in the EU regional policy programmes
was spent on the projects which will be realized
even without this support. The main variables
influencing the deadweight effect were the amounts
of grant received and the type of grant. Investment
grants have much higher deadweight than
educational or employment grants. The more
financial funds enterprises obtained through
the grant, the more deadweight effect occurred.
All other variables were not statistically significant
in our model. Applying this to regional policy,
the higher support for educational projects leads
to the lower deadweight effect. The support of
technology transfers looks more appropriate for
newly established companies.
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The deadweight effect could substantially
limit the effectiveness and efficiency of
programmes. However, the deadweight is only
one possible ineffective use of public support.
In order to correctly evaluate impact and
effectiveness of programmes, we need to make
a complex evaluation based on several micro
studies of different effects. There also could be
other negative effects. Even if there is ‘zero
deadweight’, and all the firms indicate that in
the absence of grant assistance they would not
have been able to realize projects, there is the
threat that the assistance given to one firm
could displace jobs elsewhere in the region [17]
and thus the whole region effect of support will
be negative. On the other hand, even in the
existence of deadweight spending, public
subsidies may have a variety of other positive
impacts on regional development, then also
other implications that investment subsidies
might have for economic activity, employment,
growth, cooperation or networks must be
evaluated.
In addition, comparison of ex ante analysis
with ex post information could provide valuable
information on appraising the deadweight effect
of a project [17]. It could help the identification
of inefficiencies so that the support scheme
could be improved at least in some aspects.
The change of criteria in evaluation process
to avoid the deadweight could be recom-
mended for policy actions. The present criteria
are much more oriented to select „the best
performance“ projects. Such projects usually
are the best candidates for the deadweight
effect. More relevant indicators and criteria
should be applied to analyse the need of the
project for enterprise and especially for region
where support is provided. Another possible
policy implication could be more oriented on
newly established enterprises in the transfer
technology projects. Stronger orientation also
can be recommended on „soft“ educational
projects. The total level of deadweight (36.8 %)
also raises the question of effectiveness of
direct support of a private enterprise as such.
One third of the funds is spent ineffectively. If
we add problems with possible distortion of the
competitive environment in this support, more
orientation of public support to more general
activities supported business environment
could be recommended.
The article was supported from the VEGA
project 1/0093/12 „Effectiveness of EU regional
policy in Slovak Republic“.
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Abstract
ARE SUBSIDIES REALLY NEEDED? THE CASE OF EU REGIONAL POLICY IN
THE CZECH AND SLOVAK REPUBLICS
Miroslav ·ipikal, Peter Pisár, Viera Labudová
Regional policy is one of the most important EU policies. Large amounts of resources used for
support programmes automatically put forward the question of their effectiveness and efficiency.
These aspects can be examined both from macro and micro perspectives. In this article we focus
on one aspect of inefficiency – "deadweight". This effect occurs if public subsidy is spent on
activities that would have happened even without these resources. We examine the effect on
selected projects for small and medium-sized enterprises in the Czech and Slovak Republics. The
article consists of four parts. First we discuss theoretical background for using the subsidies as
development tool. Then we look more closely on the definition of deadweight effect and previous
studies analyzing it. In the methodology part we discuss different approaches how to measure this
effect and introduce methodology in our research. We also discuss potential problems with
interpretation of the results and in the final part we present the results of our research and some
policy implications.
We found out that the deadweight effect is quite substantial and represents more than 35 % of
public subsidies. The project characteristics itself (type of project, amount of budget) has the
highest significance for the deadweight effect. The deadweight effect is higher for investments
projects compared to the support of education or employment. The probability of the deadweight
effect is also decreasing with the total amount of subsidies.
Key Words: Deadweight effect, public support programmes, structural funds, regional policy,
regional government, regional competitiveness.
JEL Classification: R58.
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